首先我还是推荐大家我前一段时间推荐大家的那两本书：James Hinton写的四本Selections from Manuscripts，配合着黑格尔的精神现象学看，是我觉得目前能得到的最高两个角度的真相。但是Hinton的书对一些细枝末节的地方没有说或没有说很详细，如轮回等，而精神现象学则是不说人话。
另外想推荐的几本是一个印裔美国人写的，对密度和各种身体以及轮回以及各种数字符号的细节进行了详细说明。大家可以自行从安娜的档案搜索，能下载的有九本，定价还挺贵。这个作者叫Vashisht Vaid。可能这也应了Ra的一句话： 47.8 There are many other names for this body, especially in your so-called Indian Sutras or writings, for there are those among these peoples which have explored these regions and understand the various types of devachanic bodies. There are many, many types of bodies in each density, much like your own. 印度人对各种身体的探索比较熟悉，
另外我好像想通了一个点，地球的三密度幻象应该是罩纱最重的一个，目的就是为了历练实体的意识状态（states of consciousness）从而有可能做到完全的自我牺牲，从而从这个宇宙毕业从而脱离所有幻象，其他星球罩纱没那么重或者科技比较发达，所以做不到完全的自我牺牲？但是感觉这个理论站不住脚，而且我感觉暂时也想不明白，因为人类未来的命运还是个未知数。
地球远比我们想像的更加重要，起码作为一个课堂，学生会换，但是教室不能炸。地球将会是整个宇宙的种族大熔炉。
感谢回复。说到辩证法，Hinton对扬弃一词选择的英文词是suppression，这个词我感觉我经常自己下意识地在做这件事：我其实在接触hinton前已经看了一年多精神现象学了，一直不太懂扬弃是怎么个扬弃法，因为我个人认为精神现象学的来源很高，一直觉得可能是很高的一种意识状态或者需要好几个转世才能完成一下扬弃，但是as above, so below，一个大扬弃是由多个小扬弃组成的，我在生活中只要觉得自我占优势了或者做对了或者高兴了就会下意识地suppression（压制/扬弃），也就是hinton说的扬弃self-righteousness（自我正确）。可能不太能交流清楚这种感觉，我是今天刚想明白的。但是既然我现在意识到这是应该做的正确的事了，是否意味着我自我感觉“我扬弃自我正确”这件事是正确的，即，自我正确被扬弃后留下了真空，而后被更多自我正确填满。就像在自我修炼中努力去除掉自我，当成功后就会觉得自己做对了成功了，就会又被自我占据。对此，Hinton这么说：
This suppression of self-righteousness is the most essential thing to do : the introduction of the idea of love, or sanctification only in self-surrender. Yet as a suppression it has necessarily left a blank, a void, into wh arbitrariness, that is selfishness, has again come ; but only for a higher life to take its place.
Above all, seeming is an actuality of a real thing; it is the real thing in its own reality, which is actualized as seeming. It is not to seem reality, but reality in seeming. But in the second place, it is actuality in “direction”; otherwise the real thing would not have any seeming. Something seems to be or not to be only if it seems to be or not be what it “might be”. That is, seeming is an actuality but in a certain direction, since as we have seen, “might be” is formally direction. But this is not yet sufficient, because the “might be” is always and only a determined “might be”. Something seems to be or not to be not what it might be without further ado, but what such and such a determinate thing might be. The determination of the “might be” is essential to seeming. Seeming, then, is not directional actuality but actuality in a “determinate” direction.
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